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During the 1990s, low-educated single mothers left cash welfare and increased their labor 
force participation at unprecedented rates (Blank 2006). A number of factors contributed to these 
dramatic changes: the 1996 welfare reform, the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), and the economic expansion of the late 1990s (Ellwood 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum 
2001). An important question is the extent to which increased work effort by low-educated single 
mothers who experience job loss has translated into increased access to unemployment insurance 
(UI). 
 Spurred by recent research conducted at the Upjohn Institute that focuses on UI receipt 
among former TANF recipients (O’Leary and Kline 2008), the current study addresses three 
questions about the UI utilization of low-educated single mothers:  
1) Has the large growth in labor force participation among adult single mothers since the 
early 1990s been accompanied by a growth in UI participation by this population when they 
experience a spell of unemployment?  
2) Has eligibility for UI changed over time for this group, and are nonmonetary or 
monetary eligibility requirements now more important? 
3) Has the relative importance of three major income support programs—UI, the Food 
Stamp Program, and cash welfare—changed for single mothers who enter a spell of 
unemployment? 
Background  
Eligibility for benefits depends on two factors: monetary and nonmonetary eligibility.   
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In order to be monetarily eligible, an individual typically must have a minimum level of 
earnings from a qualified employer over four out of five recent quarters. The minimum earnings 
threshold varies by state but is generally in the range of $1,000 to $3,000. Some states also 
impose a high quarter requirement, which is a separate minimum earnings amount in one of the 
quarters. Some recent studies find that TANF leavers and other groups of low-wage workers 
already have high rates of monetary eligibility (O’Leary and Kline 2008; Shaefer 2010). High 
levels of monetary eligibility among vulnerable populations suggest that this is not the primary 
factor driving low levels of UI participation.   
Nonmonetary eligibility has to do with an individual’s reason for job loss, and whether or 
not the would-be recipient is looking for work.  Though some states now allow workers who 
voluntarily quit for good cause (such as to care for a sick family member, loss of child care, or to 
escape domestic violence) to maintain eligibility, most states only provide unemployment 
benefits to those who have experienced involuntary job loss. A number of existing studies 
suggest that nonmonetary requirements may be the more important barrier to UI eligibility facing 
vulnerable workers (Holzer 2000; O’Leary and Kline 2008; Rangarajan et al. 2002). Indeed, it 
appears that low-wage workers are disproportionately employed in industries that tend to avoid 
formal layoffs (GAO 2000; Lambert 2008). 
A final factor affecting access to UI is benefits take-up. Wandner and Stettner (2000) 
report that more than half of the unemployed do not file for UI, and that the most common 
reason cited is “perceived ineligibility.”  Furthermore, low-wage unemployed workers who are 
eligible for UI may be less likely to take up UI benefits as compared to more advantaged eligible 
unemployed workers (Shaefer 2010).  
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CURRENT STUDY 
To address the question of how the public program participation of recently unemployed 
low-educated single mothers has changed over time, we compare them to similarly educated 
single childless women.  We use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), a nationally representative, longitudinal data set collected by the U.S. Census Bureau 
that, among other things, asks questions about labor market participation and public benefit 
receipt.  We focus on a subset of working-age1 single women who have, at most, a high school 
degree.  Among such women, we look specifically at those who have entered a spell of 
unemployment.2
We focus on relative outcomes between single mothers and single childless women 
because these two subpopulations likely experience similar labor market dynamics. In this way 
we hope to control for external factors leading to changes in program eligibility and 
participation, and thus feel more confident that any observed outcomes are due to policy reforms. 
  Our study period is 1990 to 2005, with the early years, 1990 to 1994, defined 
as prereform, and the later years, 2001 to 2005, defined as postreform. Both the pre- and 
postreform periods included mild recessions, while the in-between period saw a major economic 
boom.  The middle period was also when most states implemented welfare reform. 
For the purpose of this study, a woman is considered to have participated in UI if she 
reported receiving cash benefits from her state’s program during the first three months following 
a job separation. To estimate monetary eligibility for the program, each worker’s wages in a 
simulated base period were compared to her state’s minimum earning requirements. To estimate 
nonmonetary eligibility, a woman is considered to have met these requirements if her 
                                                 
1 We define working age as 22–55. 
2 Entering a spell of unemployment is defined as having been employed and having worked the previous 
month, and not working but seeking work in the current month, based on a woman’s self-report. 
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unemployment spell began because she experienced an involuntary job loss. Women who 
reported being fired or voluntarily quitting were considered ineligible. When we compare the 
importance of UI participation to that of participation in other income support programs, we rely 
on women’s self-reported receipt of either cash welfare or food stamps during the same period. 
FINDINGS 
As we would expect, between the pre- and postreform periods, the proportion of single 
mothers who work rose considerably. During the same period, the proportion of single childless 
women employed actually fell somewhat. We estimate that, as a result, the employment rate for 
single mothers increased by 18 percentage points relative to that of the comparison group.  But 
did this dramatic increase in work effort among low-educated single mothers translate into 
improved access to UI benefits during times of unemployment?  To our knowledge, ours is the 
first study to look across an extended period, on a national level, at changes in UI eligibility and 
benefit receipt among women likely to have been affected by welfare reform. 
UI Benefits:  Eligibility and Receipt 
Looking first at nonmonetary UI eligibility, we see in Table 1 that for both groups of 
women, rates of nonmonetary eligibility are rather low.  Roughly 40 percent of low-educated 
single mothers experiencing a spell of unemployment were nonmonetarily eligible for UI during 
both the pre- and postreform periods.  The rate of nonmonetary eligibility among similar 
childless women actually fell—from about 46 percent to 36 percent across the two periods. This 
led to an 8-percentage-point relative improvement in the nonmonetary eligibility of single 
mothers as compared to single childless women. 
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As Table 1 shows, the low-educated single women in our study are more likely to meet 
monetary UI requirements than nonmonetary requirements.  In both the prereform and 
postreform periods, childless women were more likely than single mothers to be monetarily 
eligible for UI, but the gap declined over time.  During the prereform period, 71.5 percent of 
single mothers and 84 percent of single childless women were monetarily eligible for UI upon 
entering a spell of unemployment.  During the postreform period, the figures are 77 percent and 
83 percent, respectively. Thus, the relative rate of monetary eligibility for single mothers 
compared to single childless women increased by 7 percentage points. 
Interestingly—and perhaps surprisingly since the eligibility rates of single mothers 
improved relative to those of single childless women—when we look at rates of UI benefit 
receipt, we find that single mothers did not improve their probability of accessing UI benefits, 
relative to single childless women, between the pre- and postreform periods. It is hard to know 
exactly why this is the case. The most commonly cited reason for failing to file for 
unemployment benefits is presumed ineligibility (Vroman 2009; Wandner and Stettner 2000). 
Also, low-wage workers who meet eligibility criteria may be less likely to take advantage of 
unemployment benefits than eligible higher-paid workers because they are more likely to 
presume they are ineligible (Shaefer 2010). 
In an effort to ascertain whether the above findings were not explained by unobserved 
differences or changes in the makeup of the two groups of women (for instance, varying 
educational levels or ethnic backgrounds), we also conducted multivariate analyses that allowed 
us to control for a number of factors, including age, race, education, state, and the unemployment 
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rate. We find that the results hold, with the relative differences in UI receipt between the two 
groups of women pre- and postreform nearly identical in magnitude.3
Relative Importance of Unemployment Insurance, Cash Welfare, and the Food Stamp 
Program / Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
 
As seen in Figure 1, during the postreform years, a greater proportion of low-educated 
single mothers entering a spell of unemployment received UI benefits than received cash 
welfare.4
Far more common than either of these programs was receipt of food stamp benefits.  
Participation in the Food Stamp Program grew in the early 1990s but declined significantly 
during the welfare reform years. The participation rates of recently unemployed low-educated 
mothers rose significantly, however, during the postreform period, from 51 percent in 2001 to 64 
percent in 2005—the highest of any year in the study.  Comparing single mothers to single 
childless women, we find that upon entering a spell of unemployment, low-educated single 
mothers are far more likely (by approximately 25 percentage points) to get some form of aid than 
are similarly educated single childless women.  This disparity stays about the same across the 
study period, despite the precipitous decline in the probability of receiving cash assistance. 
  This is the first time in our study period that this proved true for an extended period of 
time. In 2002, for example, we estimate that 16 percent of single mothers entering a spell of 
unemployment participated in cash welfare, whereas a bit more than 20 percent received 
unemployment benefits.  Since 2002, the proportion accessing TANF has shrunk even further. 
In sum, even though we do not observe an increase in UI benefit receipt, because of the 
decline in cash assistance UI became the more common form of income support for low-
                                                 
3 For regression results and discussion, see the full-length paper of the same title that this brief is based on. 
4 By cash welfare we mean Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and its predecessor, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 
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educated single mothers entering a spell of unemployment during the post–welfare reform 
period. Moreover, the probability of accessing food stamps, already the most highly utilized 
income support program among this population, increased during the postreform period.  As a 
result, the proportion of this population accessing benefits from at least one of these programs 
remained virtually unchanged across the study period. This does not say anything about the 
amount of assistance that was received, on average. 
DISCUSSION 
Recent policy efforts to boost UI participation rates of low-income workers have focused 
on reforming UI program eligibility rules.  Our results lead to the conclusion that reforming 
eligibility requirements may not, in and of itself, significantly increase benefit receipt.  While 
low-educated single mothers have seen both their monetary and nonmonetary eligibility rates 
improve relative to similarly educated childless women, they have not realized relative 
improvements in benefit receipt.  This may be due to a lack of knowledge about the program, a 
lack of understanding of a complex bureaucratic process, a quick transition back to work, or a 
lack of need for benefits as a result, at least in part, of greater access to the Food Stamp Program. 
 To the extent that eligibility criteria do act as a barrier to UI for this population, we, like 
others before us, find that nonmonetary requirements are a greater barrier than are monetary 
requirements.  Some might argue that low rates of nonmonetary eligibility result from personal 
characteristics of low-educated single mothers, who may lack the skills or discipline to maintain 
employment.  If this were true, the best way to increase UI receipt might be through increased 
job training programs that focus on these skills.  On the other hand, most working single mothers 
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who become unemployed do meet UI monetary eligibility requirements, suggesting a substantial 
attachment to the labor force.    
Another possibility is reforming nonmonetary UI requirements to allow individuals who 
quit a job (not those who were terminated for cause) and meet certain requirements to access 
benefits.  Though this raises serious issues of moral hazard (individuals may have an incentive to 
quit if they know they can receive benefits), many other western industrial countries have more 
liberal policies, limiting nonmonetary ineligibility to a few weeks or months rather than the 
entire unemployment spell (Storey and Neisner 1997). 
The UI Modernization Act offers an incentive for states to take a step in this direction. It 
made $7 billion available to be split among state UI programs if they adopt certain measures to 
increase UI eligibility. To receive the first third of their share, states must adopt an Alternative 
Base Period (ABP), which allows workers to count earnings from their most recently completed 
quarter in determining eligibility.  This should benefit low-wage workers (Coven and Stone 
2009).  
States can receive the final two-thirds of their UI modernization incentive payments if 
they make two of four additional reforms. One of the four options is to relax nonmonetary 
requirements to make eligible those who quit for “compelling family reasons,” which include 
domestic violence, illness or disability of an immediate family member, or a spouse’s 
employment relocation.  As of November 2010, a total of 18 states had adopted at least two of 
these four provisions (USDOL 2010). Measures such as these could go a long way toward 
improving UI receipt among low-educated single working mothers when they experience a spell 
of unemployment.  
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Table 1  UI Program Participation and Eligibility of Low-Educated Single Women, Ages 22–55 
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UI participation, single women entering unemployment    


















Monetary eligibility for UI, single women entering unemployment    


















Nonmonetary eligibility for UI, single women entering unemployment    


















NOTE:  ** Statistically significantly different from same-column estimate for 1990–1994 by 0.05 level or above.  
Standard errors clustered by state. 







Blank, Rebecca M. 2006. “What Did the 1990s Welfare Reforms Accomplish?” Public Policy 
and the Income Distribution, Alan J. Auerbach, David Card, and John M. Quigley, eds. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 33–79. 
 
Coven, Martha, and Chad Stone. 2009. Unemployment Insurance Reforms Should Be Part of 
Economic Recovery Package: McConnell Criticism of Part-Time Worker Proposal Is 
Misplaced. Washington, DC:  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
http://www.cbpp.org/1-6-09ui.htm (accessed January 18, 2011).   
 
Ellwood, David T. 2000. “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Policy 
Reforms on Work, Marriage, and Living Arrangements.”  National Tax Journal 53(4, 
part 2): 1063–1105. 
 
General Accounting Office (GAO). 2000. Unemployment Insurance: Role as Safety Net for Low-
Wage Workers Is Limited. Report to Congressional Requesters. Washington, DC: General 
Accounting Office. 
 
Holzer, Harry J. 2000. Unemployment Insurance and Welfare Recipients: What Happens When 
the Recession Comes? Assessing the New Federalism A-46.  Washington, DC:  Urban 
Institute. 
 
Lambert, Susan J. 2008. “Passing the Buck: Labor Flexibility Practices That Transfer Risk onto 
Hourly Workers.” Human Relations 61(9): 1203–1227. 
 
Meyer, Bruce D., and Rosenbaum, Dan T. 2001. “Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 
the Labor Supply of Single Mothers. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3): 1063–
1114. 
 
O’Leary, Christopher J., and Kenneth J. Kline. 2008. UI as a Safety Net for Former TANF 
Recipients. Final Report.  ASPE Project HS-05-001. Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services. 
 
Rangarajan, Anu, Carol Razafindrakoto, and Walter Corson. 2002. Study to Examine UI 
Eligibility among Former TANF Recipients: Evidence from New Jersey. Final Report.  
Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research. 
 
Shaefer, H. Luke. 2010. Identifying Key Barriers to Unemployment Insurance for Disadvantaged 
Workers in the United States. Journal of Social Policy 39(3): 439–460. 
 
Storey, James R., and Jennifer A. Neisner. 1997. “Unemployment Compensation in the Group of 
Seven Nations.” In Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy 
12 
Issues, Christopher J. O’Leary and Stephen A. Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. 599–667. 
 
U.S. Department of Labor.  2010.  UI Modernization Incentive Payments: Information about 
Approved Applications.  Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), Office 
of Unemployment Insurance. http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/laws.asp#modern 
(accessed January 19, 2011).   
 
Vroman, Wayne. 1998. Effects of Welfare Reform on Unemployment Insurance. Assessing the 
New Federalism A-22. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
 
Wandner, Stephen A., and Andrew Stettner. 2000. “Why Are Many Jobless Workers Not 
Applying for Benefits?” Monthly Labor Review 123(June): 21–33. 
 
